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THE REASONS BEHIND THE RULES IN
THE LAW OF BUSINESS TORTS
Charles M. Weber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs were the owners of the Bannister, a trading vessel lying
off the coast of Camroon, in western Africa. A canoe with
natives on board sailed out to the Bannister for the purpose of
establishing trade. While returning to shore, the natives were
fired upon by a cannon stationed on a nearby ship, the Othello,
whose master, the defendant, intended thereby to deter the natives
from trading with the Bannister. As the result, plaintiffs lost
their trade.
Plaintiffs sued. The case came before the Court of the King's
Bench in England in 1793. It was held that plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover from defendant on the ground that the natives
were prevented from trading with plaintiffs by the improper con-
duct of defendant.'
The above case illustrates a "business tort." In a general sense,
a "tort" is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which
the courts give the injured party a remedy against the wrong-
doer.2 Although it is quite correct to say that a "business tort"
is one type of tort, the term "business tort" has not yet acquired
a definite meaning. As used here, it refers to that area of the
law which determines the nature and extent of the legal protec-
tion given to an individual against interference with his business
relations with others and also against interference with those
special forms of intangible business property which do not or-
iginate in contract.3 Within this area there are some classes of
* A.B., 1936, Colgate University; LL.B,, 1939, Cornell University; Mem-
ber of the New York Bar; Assistant Professor of Business Law, Whar-
ton School of Finance & Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake's N.P. 205, 170 Eng.Rep. 153 (K.B.
1793). (abr.).
2 Sims v. Sims, 77 N.J.L. 251, 252, 72 A. 424, 425, (1909); Jewett
v. Ware, 107 Va. 802, 806, 60 S.E. 131, 132 (1908). The law of torts
also has been referred to as "the law of civil liability for wrongs."
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 456, 463 (1897). "A
really satisfactory definition of a tort has yet to be found." Prosser,
Torts 1 (2d ed. 1955).
3 E.g., trade-marks, trade names, trade secrets, patents and copyrights.
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wrongful conduct to which names have been assigned and other
classes which are nameless.
4
Thus the law of business torts comprehends the legal prin-
ciples relating to interference with contractual relations, inter-
ference with prospective advantage, boycotts, disparagement, some
types of slander, commercial bribery, predatory business prac-
tices, and unfair competition in the broad sense. It also refers
to those principles which relate to infringement of trade-marks,
trade names, patents, copyrights, trade secrets and other forms
of intangible business property which do not originate in con-
tract. Finally, it includes violations of the antitrust laws, the
fair trade laws, and other statutes relating to business conduct,
to the extent that they furnish a basis for a civil action by the
person injured.
II. THE GOALS OF THE LAW AND HOW
THEY ARE PURSUED
An attempt to explain the reasons behind the rules5 in the
law of business torts (or in any other area of the law) is likely
to lead into the realm of jurisprudence, for it raises fundamental
questions. What is the purpose of law? How does law operate
in our society? Despite all efforts to be objective, the answers
are likely to be determined in no small degree by the experience
of, and other factors which are personal to, the individual seek-
ing the answers. 6
4 Two widely different theories prevail in the law of torts. The nominate
theory holds that there is no law of torts, but only a law of unconnected
torts-a set of pigeonholes, each bearing a name such as "trespass"
or "conversion!' into which the defendant's conduct must be fitted
before the law will afford a remedy. Prosser, Torts 3 (2d ed. 1955).
The prima facie theory would determine liability by the answers to
three questions: (1) has plaintiff suffered legal harm? (2) was de-
fendant responsible for it? and (3) was defendant's conduct justified?
See Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practices, 43-51 (1950). "Fortunately,
most courts which have sought to use the doctrine have not read
in a requirement of design to injure." Note, "The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine," 52 Col. L. Rev. 503, 507 (1952). "I think that there
is a general theory to be discovered although resting in tendency
rather than established and accepted." Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 456, 471 (1897).
5 As used here, "rules" is synonymous with "principles."
6 It seems likely that an explanation of the reasons behind the rules
will be, to a corresponding degree, subjective rather than objective.
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A. SOCIAL CONTROL
Some do not find absolute answers. This does not mean
that further inquiry is futile, for "(L) aw in all its meanings is a
practical matter .... If we cannot give an answer which is
absolutely demonstrable to everyone and wholly convincing to
the philosopher, it does not follow that we may not have a good
workable blueprint of what we are trying to do and be able to
make a good practical approximation of what we seek to achieve."1
7
To some, including the writer, the end of the law appears to
be social control. That is to say, the legal system, as we know it,
made up of its principles, its instituti6ns, the individuals who
participate in its operation and administration, all these and many
others, work in a general way to exercise control over society
by influencing the conduct of the individuals who comprise it.
This it does by offering guidance, by prediction, by suggestion,
by threats, and in many other ways.
Of course, law is not the only institution participating in the
process of social control." Ethics, philosophy, religion, education,
and numerous other institutions participate, some perhaps to a
much greater extent than the law, although there is no way of
either proving or disproving this. At least, it seems clear that
there are many important values which are protected and pro-
moted more effectively by other institutions.
It is well recognized that the making of law is a judicial as
well as a legislative function. 9 It is also true that administrators,
attorneys, teachers of law and the other social sciences, as well
as many others, participate. In fact, the law-making process is
so pervasive that it extends to almost all aspects of our environ-
ment. However, it scarcely can be denied that judges and legis-
lators play the principal roles in the process; therefore, this dis-
7Pound, "My Philosophy of Law" in My Philosophy of Law-Credos
of Sixteen American Scholars, 249, 250-51 (1941).
8 "Perhaps the time has come to enlarge Maitland's figure of the law
as a seamless web. For while it is only in comparatively recent
years that the inferdependence of the social sciences has come to
be recognized, it is today a generally accepted axiom that the law,
as a means of social control... , is but a part of the broader subject
of the relation of the individual to the group." Julian M. Mack in
his introduction to Law and the Modern Mind, Jerome Frank, (1930).
9 "1 take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."
Cardoza, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10 (1921).
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cussion is concerned chiefly with finding the reasons behind the
rules in the law of business torts as this law is developed by
judges and legislators as they participate in the process.10
B. TnE Aims OF SOCIAL CONTROL
To state that the purpose of law is to participate in the pro-
cess of social control is to tell nothing of the aims of such control.
Are there any broad goals which are likely to play a substantial
and consistent part in determining which choices are made by
those engaged in the law-making process, particularly judges and
legislators? It appears that there are. First is the general pur-
pose of satisfying the present wants of the various members of
society. Perhaps this purpose always will be dominant, for it,
more than anything else, assures the law of the general support
by members of society which is essential to the exercise of its
proper influence. Next is the purpose of satisfying the wants of
society and its members in the near as well as in the distant
future. Finally, there appears to be a purpose to work for the
moral and intellectual betterment of society and its individual
members in the short run as well as in the long run. Doubtless
there are other goals, but these appear to be the major goals.
C. ACHIEVING THESE GoALs
Of course, those participating in the law-making process are
not always in complete agreement as to the methods to be used
in achieving these goals; and even the areas of agreement are
likely to change from time to time. Also, the purposes of social
control are likely to be implied rather than expressly stated.
However, they are present nonetheless."
10 Of course, the area within which the judge may rightly participate
is much more limited than the area within which the legislature may
rightly act. "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.
He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is
to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." Id. at 141.
11 "(T)he institution of our law contains an ideology and a body of
pervasive and powerful ideals which are largely unspoken, largely
implicit, and which pass almost unenumerated in the books." Llewel-
lyn, "My Philosophy of Law," My Philosophy of Law-Credos of
Sixteen American Scholars 183, 184 (1941). "The ends to which
courts have addressed themselves, the reasons and the motives
have guided them, have often been vaguely felt, . . . seldom explic-
itly avowed." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 117 (1921).
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Moreover, it may be that motivation is mixed. Perhaps there
have crept into the considerations of the judge or the legislator
factors which should carry no weight-selfishness, vindictiveness,
jealousy, bias.12 To the extent that such factors have influenced
the determination,, law is not serving its true purpose. Rather,
it is being perverted. However, it is believed that, although
there is no way of proving this, in the bulk of the decisions
made by judges and legislators in carrying out the law-making
process the overall goals of social control play substantial and
consistent parts.13
Naturally, the broad goals of society are not acted upon
directly. The extent to which they are promoted depends upon
the extent to which numerous diverse interests on which they
depend are in turn promoted. Thus, the goal of satisfying human
wants is promoted by advancing any interest which encourages
industry, efficiency, and invention, and the goal of moral better-
ment is promoted by advancing any interest which causes people
to act honestly and unselfishly.
As the law-making process is carried out, many diverse in-
terests, individual as well as social, are revealed. For example,
there are interests in controlling and protecting one's physical
person, in privacy, in reputation, in belief and opinion, in self-
expression, in learning, and in relations with other persons. There
are interests in property, including the interest in possessing,
controlling, enjoying, excluding others from, and transferring prop-
erty, either while living or at death. There are interests in con-
tracts and other promised advantages, in cultural advantages, in
opportunity, in industry, in political services and their develop-
ment, in the security of social institutions, in morality, in justice,
1 2 Factors of this type may be causes, but they are not reasons.
13 "Every judge consulting his own experience must be conscious of
times when a free exercise of will, directed of set purpose to the
furtherance of the common good, determined the form and tendency
of a rule which at that moment took its origin in one creative
act." Cardoza, The Nature of the Judicial Process 103-04 (1921).
"Law is indeed an historical growth, for it is an expression of a
customary morality which develops silently... from one age to
another.... But law is also a conscious and purposed growth,
for the expression of customary morality will be false unless the
mind of the judge is directed to the attainment of the moral end
and its embodiment in legal forms.... The standards or patterns
of utility and morals will be found by the judge in the life of the
community. They will be found in the same way by the legislator."
Id. at 105.
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in safety, in peace, in health, in security, and in many other
things. 14
III. LAW-MAKING IN THE AREA OF BUSINESS TORTS
Law-making, whether by the court or by the legislature, is
a dynamic process in which the various interests are constantly
in a state of change, appearing in different combinations and in
different settings, each competing with the others for increased
recognition and weight as the various interests take their places
on the scales of justice. The judge and the legislator are func-
tioning most effectively when each of the relevant interests in a
given situation is taken into consideration and given due weight.1r
When law-making takes place in the area of business torts,
the process of weighing and balancing interests operates with
14 See Sayre, Introduction to a Philosophy of Law 18 (1951). See
also Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, 56-59 (2d ed.
1914). Many other interests may be thought of, some of them
worthy of protection, some unworthy. Discussion here proceeds on
the basis of interests which should be advanced; but discussion also
might proceed by referring to their opposites.
15 "Practically every rule of law originates out of a conflict of human
interests, whether the controversy is settled and the rule enumerated
by legislature or by judicial action." Dickinson, The Law Behind
the Law, 29 Col.L.Rev. 285, 296 (1929). "The whole fabric of
civilized, social and commercial life, and the enjoyment of liberty
and ownership of property are based upon compromises and lim-
itations. . ." Judge Reese, in State v. Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 260,
117 N.W. 768, 770 (1908).
"What we are seeking to do and must do in a civilized society
is to adjust relations and order conduct in a world in which the
goods of existence, the scope of free activity, and the objects on
which to exert free activity are limited, and the demands upon
those goods and those objects are infinite." Pound, "My Philosophy
of Law"-Credos of Sixteen American Scholars 249-251 (1941).
"(L)ogic and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in com-
bination shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces
shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the com-
parative importance or value of the social interests that will be
thereby promoted or impaired." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 112 (1921).
'Within the fields in which legal judgments are given, moral
right, economic utility, public order, desire for social readjustment,
or for social stability-all these things tend to break the pattern
that technical law attempts to create out of past judgmens and formu-
lations, and there is almost never an occasion in which these con-
siderations are willfully- ignored by those who issue legal judgments."
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full vigor as the interests of society and of the various individuals,
enterprises, classes, and groups clamor for recognition.
To identify the interests which are most likely to be given
substantial weight in developing principles which determine lia-
bility in the law of business torts, it is important to recognize that
the basic assumption on which business activity is conducted in
this country is that the free enterprise system is desirable.
A. FREE ENTERPRISE-A BASIc AssuVEpTION
The term "free enterprise system" is likely to mean different
things to different people. 16 To the writer, it conveys three basic
ideas which have been expressed in various ways. One is the
idea of freedom. Although freedom carries substantial weight in
almost all areas of the law, here it is of major importance, par-
ticularly as it relates to the absence of restraint in the conduct
of economic activities. Next is the idea of private property. This
involves not only the right to possess and enjoy things but, more
important, the right to exclude others from possessing and en-
joying them except on such terms as the "owner" may establish.
Finally, there is the idea of competition. 17 In the realm of ec-
onomic activity, competition is deemed to be desirable for a
variety of reasons.' s
Rabin, "My Philosophy of Law," My Philosophy of Law-Credos of
Sixteen American Scholars 287, 299 (1941).
"If you ask how he (the judge) is to know when one interest
outweights another I can only answer that he must get his knowledge
just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection;
in brief, from life itself." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Pro-
cess 112-13 (1921).
16 An excellent discussion of the system is found in Loevinger, The Law
of Free Enterprise (1949).
17 For generations there has been practical agreement upon the propo-
sition that competition in trade and business is desirable, and this
idea has found expression in the decisions of the courts as well as
in statutes. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 149, 119 N.W. 946, 947
(1909). "Monopoly in trade, or in any kind of business in this coun-
try, is odious to our form of government .... Its tendency is ...
destructive of free institutions, and repugnant to the instincts of a
free people." State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 716-17,
46 N.W. 155, 160 (1890). See Jones, Historical Development of the
Law of Business Competition, 35 Yale L. J. 905 (1926) and 36 Yale
L. J. 42, 207, 351 (1926-27).
18 "Public policy unquestionably favors competition in trade, to the end
that its commodities may be afforded to the consumer as cheaply as
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That the system is not without its flaws and that other systems
of conducting economic activity are possible, is admitted.19 None-
theless there is general agreement that the free enterprise system
is best for us; and it is a deeply engrained tenet of our public
policy to maintain and strengthen the system.
The interest which each person has in his freedom to pur-
sue economic activity as he, rather than someone else, determines,
is an important interest. So is the social interest in competition.
Occasionally, as we shall see, they appear on opposite sides of
the scales of justice. When they appear -on the same side of
the scales they carry great weight and a court is likely to de-
clare the existence of the "right" to pursue a profit, which is
usually considered to be the fundamental "right" in the law of
business torts.20
possible, and is opposed to monopolies, which tend to advance market
prices ... ." Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880).
"Generally speaking, economists support competition for four series
of reasons, which are of coordinate importance: (1) because the actual
level of prices in competitive markets should in the short run more
accurately reflect the influence of demand and of cost, and thus in
the long run help guide the flow of capital and other resources to-
ward the most productive possible uses; (2) because the goad of
competition provides powerful and pervasive incentives for product
innovations and product development, and for long run cost reduc-
tion, both through improved technology and improved management;
these forces make themselves felt in the constant process of product
variation, and through the pressures implicit in the fact that com-
petitive conditions offer an open opportunity to new entrants in a
particular industry; (3) because competitive conditions in business
should lead to an equitable diffusion of the resulting real income
among consumers and factors of production; and (4) a view held with
somewhat less unanimity than the others, because the more flexible
prices of competitive markets should make it easier and cheaper for
the economy to adjust to industrial fluctuations, and for the Federal
Reserve System and the Government to carry through effective con-
tracyclical programs of stabilization, primarily utilizing methods of
monetary and fiscal policy." Report of Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Law 317-18 (March 31, 1955).
19 "Undoubtedly competition involves waste. What human activity does
not?" Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness 105 (1934). '7hen compe-
tition is left free individual error or folly will generally find a
correction in the conduct of others." Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 186 (1871).
20 "(T)he right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of
lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to
guard property already acquired." International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
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B. THE RIGHT TO PURSUE A PROT
The "right" to pursue a profit is something more than free-
dom from liability to those who are injured as the result of such
pursuit.21 The "right" to pursue a profit also gives the backing
of the courts to the interest one has in being free from unrea-
sonable intereference by others while he is pursuing his own
economic advantage.22 This principle runs through the entire
fabric of the law of business torts.23
In most cases, analysis is not aided by assuming that there
is a "right" to pursue a profit and- then proceeding from that
premise. For example, assume that the case is one in which
defendant is found to be free from liability although the plain-
tiff was injured as the result of defendant's pursuit of a profit.
It might be reasoned that defendant is free from liability because
he has a "right" to pursue a profit. It would seem sounder to
reason that the social interest in maintaining competition, when
combined with the defendant's interest in being free to pursue
a profit, outweighs the plaintiff's interest in not being injured
when this latter interest is unaccompanied by any other interest
or combination of interests sufficient to tilt the scales in the plain-
tiff's favor.
Similarly, in a case in which the plaintiff has been injured
while pursuing a profit, it is reasoned sometimes that the outcome
21 If nothing more were involved, it might be better to refer to a
"privilege." "The word 'privilege' is used... to denote the fact
that conduct which, under ordinary circumstances, would subject
the actor to liability, under particular circumstances, does not sub-ject him thereto." Restatement, Torts § 10(a) (1934). "One who
causes loss of business or occupation to another merely by engag-
ing in a business or occupation in good faith is not liable to the other
for the loss caused, though he knows that the loss will result."
Restatement, Torts § 708 (1938). This privilege was recognized in
Hompes v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 137 Neb. 84, 93-94, 288 N.W. 367, 372
(1939) wherein the court stated, "So long as the Goodrich Company...
competed for business by the usual methods without any attempt to
injure the plaintiff by stifling competition, it cannot be said that the
Junkin (antitrust) Act has been violated."
22 Such unreasonable interference may be referred to by other names
such as "unfair competition," "unfair methods of competition," or
"unfair trade."
23 "It is this right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction in the
ordinary case of unfair competition." International News Service
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237 (1918). Unless there be regu-
lation of competition, the excesses will lead to the destruction of compe-
tition and monopoly will take its place. Brandeis, The Curse of
Bigness, passim.
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must depend on whether or not the defendant's conduct was
"justified" or on whether or not the defendant's conduct consti-
tuted an "unreasonable" interference with the plaintiff's "right"
to pursue a profit. It would seem sounder to recognize that in
a case of this kind the court is called upon to consider and weigh
the various relevant interests and to make a value judgment as
to whether the promotion of one set of interests at the expense
of the interests on the opposite side of the scales is more likely
to promote the broad social goals which the judge has in mind
or whether the reverse is true.24
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS IN TYPICAL
BUSINESS TORT CASES
Perhaps a better appreciation of the operation of the process
of weighing and balancing interests by the courts can be obtained
by considering a few of the more familiar situations which have
come before the courts.
P owned a prosperous barber shop. D, a local banker, opened
a rival shop solely for the purpose of forcing P out of business.
D suceeded. P sued. Judgment for p.25
On P's side is society's interest in competition, which is pro-
moted by constructive business conduct and offended by that
which is merely predatory. On the same side is society's interest
in morality, which is promoted by discouraging such malicious
conduct. Also on P's side is his interest in freedom to pursue
economic gain and his interest in being free from interference
while he pursues economic gain. On D's side is society's, as well
as D's, interest in the freedom of the individual to do whatever
he pleases. Inasmuch as the interests in favor of P appear to be
of much greater weight than those in favor of D, it would seem
that there should have been relatively little doubt about the out-
come of the case.
However, the court felt it necessary to devote a major por-
tion, of its opinion to disproving the proposition, which appears
to have had some support at the time, that an act otherwise law-
ful cannot be converted into an unlawful act by a bad motive.
The net effect of the court's argument was that society's interest
in morality is entitled to substantial weight and that when com-
24 Rules are means, not ends. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law
59 (1921). "Few rules in our times are so well established that they
may not be called upon any day to justify their existence as a means
to an end." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 98 (1921).
25 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
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bined with society's interest in competition, and with the indi-
vidual's interest in freedom to pursue his economic advantage
without interference, outweighs the interest of the individual and
of society in the individual's freedom to do as he pleases.
The holding in the case might have been explained in terms
of broad legal principles, e.g., "D was liable because P had suf-
fered an injury of which D was the legal cause and D had acted
without justification." It might have been explained that "D
was liable because he interfered unreasonably with P's conduct of
his business", or that "D was liable because he had maliciously
injured P." It is submitted that these explanations throw insuf-
ficient light on the issues involved. For example, consider the
following case:
P is the owner of a newspaper, D a manufacturer of patent
medicines. P's editorials are extremely critical of D's medi-
cines. Intending to punish P and to earn whatever profit he can,
D enters the newspaper business in competition with P. As
the result, P is forced out of business. P sues. Judgment for D.26
What interests are involved? On P's side are much the same
interests which appeared on P's side in the barber shop case. There
is society's interest in competition, P's interest in his freedom to
pursue economic gain and to be free from interference while do-
ing so, and there is society's interest in morality, which is of-
fended by D's malicious conduct. As in the barber shop case,
on D's side is society's, as well as D's interest in the freedom of
the individual to do whatever he pleases.
If nothing more appears, it would seem that judgment must
be for P, as in the barber shop case. What new interest has
appeared on D's side to shift the scales in his favor? Several.
Sufficient to tilt the scales is society's interest in competition 27
and the individual's interest in freedom to pursue a profit. These
are enough to satisfy the court that judgment should be in D's
favor.28
26 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).
27 "(W)hen we . . . decide that there" were also legitimate purposes the
rule seems to be perfectly well established that there is no liability."
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 89, 140 N.E. 203, 205 (1923). "Why
is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows will ruin
his neighbor? It is because the public good is supposed to be best
subserved by free competition." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
Harv.L.Rev. 457, 466 (1897).
2Is Also adding weight were society's interest in justice, which is pro-
moted by permitting a person to act in self-defense, and society's in-
terest in the dissemination of information through the additional
newspaper.
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Of course, it might be argued that in the barber shop case
tfie banker was competing and that the case therefore is sub-
stantially the same as the newspaper case. This argument has
been rejected by the courts. It is pointed out that the interest
which promotes society's goals is the interest to compete in the
pursuit of economic gain and not the interest to compete solely
to determine who can destroy the other.2 9  It was D's interest
in this destructive "competition" which the court, in the barber
shop case, refused to recognize as worthy of protection.
Putting aside the question of bogus or simulated competition
and assuming that the competition by D is genuine, and turning
away from the case in which D acts in a spirit of spite and so
offends society's interest in morality, let us ask whether there
are any interests which may outweigh the interest of society in
genuine competition and the interest of the individual to pursue
in good faith his own economic advantage. Consider the follow-
ing case:
P entered into a contract with X Hotel whereby he was to
serve as exclusive agent in New England to book patrons for
the Hotel and the Hotel was to pay him a commission based on
the amount of patronage which resulted. Familiar with the
nature of this contract, and wishing to obtain for himself an
agency contract to perform similar service for the Hotel, but
bearing no actual malice toward P, D persuaded X Hotel that
it was a mistake to give an exclusive agency to one person, and
thereby induced X Hotel to break its contract with P. P sued D.
Judgment for p.30
What interests are involved? Here, as in the newspaper case,
there are present society's interest in competition and P's own
interest in being free to pursue economic gain without interfer-
ence. Since D is acting without actual malice, his conduct is not
as offensive to society's interest in morality. However, there is
some small offense to the interest in morality in the fact that D
29 "It is not competition to resort to the methods of the prize ring, and
simply 'knock the other man out.' That is killing a competitor."
Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness 115 (1934). "To call such conduct
competition is a perversion of terms." Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,
151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909). "The laws of competition in business
are harsh enough at best; but if the rule here suggested were to
be carried to its logical and seemingly unavoidable extreme there
is no practical limit to the wrongs which may be justified upon the
theory that 'it is business'." Dunshee v. standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa
618, 623, 132 N.W. 371, 373 (1911). Cf. McCartney v. Berlin, 31 Neb.
411, 47 N.W. 1111 (1891).
30 Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817 (1907). See also
Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
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knows his conduct will injure P; but this interest is offended in
almost all cases where one is competing. However viewed, it
seems that up to this point, P's position is no stronger than in the
newspaper case. Viewed from the standpoint of D, the same
interests appear in D's favor. He is pursuing economic gain and
has in his favor society's interest in promoting competition as
well as his own interest in freedom to pursue economic gain.
How can we account for judgment for P if it appears that
the case is one in which D's position is the same as it was in the
newspaper case and P's position is no stronger than it was in that
case? The answer is that a new interest has appeared on P's
side of the scales. This is the interest which P, as an individual,
and society, in general, has in the security of contracts a basic
ingredient in the smooth functioning of the free enterprise system.
This is a dominant interest in the law of contracts but only oc-
casionally appears on the scales in business tort cases. However,
when it does appear, it carries considerable weight. This lies
behind the frequently stated principle that competition does not
justify knowingly inducing a breach of contract.31
Although the interest of society and of the individual in the
security of contracts carries great weight, it appears that other
interests either in combination or alone sometimes .outweigh it.
3 2
This appears in the following case:
P contracts to sell a described farm to X. D learns of this con-
tract and, believing that he, D, is owner of the farm, so advises
X. As the result, X breaks his contract with P. P sues D for
damages sustained. Judgment for D.33
The interests present here on both sides appear to be very
much the same as those appearing in the exclusive agency case
except that here D is not a competitor seeking to make a con-
31 "The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of a
third person does not create a privilege to cause the third person
to commit a breach of contract with the other. . . ." Restatement,
Torts § 768(2) (1939). See also Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927).
32 Prosser, Torts 737 (2d ed. 1955).
33 "(N)o action lay against one for saying that he himself had title
or estate in lands, although it were false." Pennyman v. Banks
(1596) Cro. Eliz. 427; accord, Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785, 224
N.W. 202 (1929); Bogosian v. First National Bank, 133 N.J.Eq. 404,
32 A.2d 585 (1943); Miller v. First National Bank, 220 Iowa 1266,
264 N.W. 272 (1935). See also Jeremiah Smith, "Disparagement of
Property", 13 Col. L. Rev. 13, 30-36 (1913).
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tract with X. However, it is generally agreed that this would
not strengthen D's position but would, if anything, tend to weaken
it. What new interest is present to tilt the scales in favor of D?
It is D's interest in being free to assert and protect his claims to
property.3 4 This is highly important to the institution of prop-
erty which in turn is one of the essentials of our free enterprise
system. It is the interest which lies behind the court's decision
to exonerate the patent holder who induces a licensee to break
his licensing contract with another patent holder by charging that
the exercise of the license constitutes an infringement of the de-
fendant's patent.35
V. REFLECTIONS OF THE PROCESS OF
BALANCING INTERESTS
That the courts often think and act in terms of balancing
interests also is evidenced by the frequency with which a partic-
ular interest is given substantially the same weight in the con-
sideration of several quite different types of harmful conduct.
Thus, the interest which has just been mentioned - the interest
in being free to assert or to threaten to protect one's own prop-
erty rights - very often tilts the scales in favor of defendant
not only where the alleged wrong is inducing breach of contract
but also where the wrong consists of disparaging, of defaming, or
inducing refusal to deal.36 Likewise, a person who answers one
who has asked for information or advice, may be shielded from
any of a number of different types of liability by the individual's
interest and the social interest in freedom 6f communication and
friendly intercourse.3 7  Broad protection also is given to mem-
34 "One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a con-
tract, . . . with a third person by in good faith asserting or threat-
ening to protect properly a legally protected interest of his own
which he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the
performance of the contract." Restatement, Torts § 773 (1939).
35 See, e.g., Alliance Securities Co. v. DeVilbiss, 41 F.2d 668 (6th Cir.
1930).
36 Restatement, Torts §§ 594, 596, 647 (1938), §§ 769, 773 (1939).
37 Id. §§ 592, 595, 596, 597, 648, 650 (1938), §§ 770, 772 (1939). 'Why
is a false and injurious statement privileged, if it is made honestly
in giving information about a servant? It is because it has been
thought more important that information should be freely given than
that a man should be protected from what under other circumstances
would be an actionable wrong." Holmes, Path of the Law, 10
Harv.L.Rev. 456, 466 (1897).
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bers of the judiciary and legislature and other public officers38
on the basis of the interests which the performance of their duties
is intended to promote. 39 Similarly, the public interest in the free
dissemination of matters of public concern, which frequently is
the basis for relieving members of the press from liability for
libel,40 also may furnish a shield against other types of liability.4'
A. PRIVEGE
Frequently the presence of some particular interest is sug-
gested by the statement that a privilege exists. 42 Thus in a given
case the court may state that a defendant's statement is privileged
because it was made while he was performing some official duty43
thereby indicating that the court recognizes the social interest
in having government officers feel free to speak and act with-
out fear of a civil suit. In another case the court may comment
that a statement is privileged because it was communicated from
a husband to his wife, 44 thus indicating that the judge has placed
on the scales of justice the interest of the individual and of
38 See, e.g., Greewood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413 (1889) where
in an action for slander brought by the city attorney of a city against
the mayor thereof for using the following language to the council
of the city: "He is unfit to hold the office of city attorney; his
opinion is too easily warped for money consideration," the court held
that as the words were spoken by the mayor to the city council,
which had power to remove the officer, the statement, if made in
good faith, was privileged.
39 Restatement, Torts §§ 585, 586, 590, 591, 635, 640, 641, 645 (1938).
40 See, e.g., Fitch v. Daily News Publishing Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217
N.W. 947 (1928) in which the court affirmed a lower court dismissal
of a suit brought by a lawyer against a newspaper for publishing
a divorce petition filed by the lawyer's wife. The court said: "The
general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made
public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private
persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings."
41 Restatement, Torts §§ 598, 611, 642 (1938).
42 See, e.g., Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223 N.W. 4 (1929). Some priv-
ileges are said to be conditional, some absolute; but even where the
privilege is said to be absolute, this is true only in a relative sense.
43 See, e.g., Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413 (1889).
44 Restatement, Torts § 592 provides, "A husband or wife is absolutely
privileged to publish to the other spouse false and defamatory mat-
ter of a third person." See Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205 (1880).
Cf. Dyer v. MacDougall, 93 F.Supp. 484 (E.D. N.Y. 1950); Springer
v. Swift, 59 S.D. 208, 239 N.W. 171 (1931).
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society in the individual's freedom to communicate with his spouse
without fear of a lawsuit.
B. ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE
In the multitude of situations in which privilege is recognized,
the scales of justice usually are almost evenly balanced. Conse-
quently, the addition of an interest contrary to that which gave
rise to the privilege often retilts the scales in favor of the plain-
tiff.45  When this happens the court is likely to state that the
privilege has been abused,46 meaning that it has been destroyed.47
Thus, where a defendant speaks on an occasion which is condi-
tionally privileged the scales will be retilted if it appears that
the defendant acts in a spirit of actual malice 4s because actual
malice offends society's interest in morality. In another case-
a defendant may be denied the advantage of a privilege because,
even though he believed what he said, he spoke without reason-
able grounds for his belief,4 9 thus offending the social interest
in encouraging persons to exercise caution before performing acts
potentially harmful to others.
"VI. TRADE-MARK AND TRADE NAME CASES
By very much the same process as that which -already has
been described, principles have developed to determine whether
45 See, e.g., Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713,
82 N.W. 28 (1900).
46 See, e.g., Farley v. McBride, 74 Neb. 49, 103 N.W. 1036 (1905). The
court, in a suit by a county sheriff against a newspaper which wrong-
fully charged that the sheriff had filed a fraudulent expense account,
said: "No attack is so hard to resist, so difficult to withstand, nor
so far-reaching in its consequences, as that which it is within the
power of an unscrupulous writer to make upon one's reputation; and,
while the press must not be muzzled, it is the duty of the courts to
preserve in so far as may be the rights of the individual and his
immunity from unwarranted attack."
47 Ibid.
48 See, e.g., Estelle v. Daily News Publishing Co., 101 Neb. 610, 164
N.W. 558 (1917) where in sustaining a verdict for a judge in a libel
suit against a newspaper, the court said: "We are not inclined to
adopt a rule which practically takes away all responsibility for the
malicious publication of that which is knowingly false, libelous and
defamatory." The defendant paper had charged that the plaintiff
judge, who was running for re-election, was associating with "the
third ward crowd," which proof showed was largely composed of
thieves, gamblers, pimps, and ballot-box stuffers.
49 See, e.g., Pierce v. Oard, 23 Neb. 828, 37 N.W. 677 (1888).
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or not liability should be imposed on the ground of infringement
of trade-marks and trade names.
To avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that these terms
are used here in the common law sense and not as they have
been defined in the Federal Trade Mark Act of 1946,50 which ap-
plies in interstate commerce.
At common law, a trade-mark is any mark, word, number, de-
sign, picture, or combination of these in any form or arrangement,
which is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which
he markets, provided it is affixed to the goods and is not used in
a manner which is against public policy.5 1 If it happens to be
a generic, descriptive, or geographical term, or a surname, there
.is a further requirement that it be used in an arbitrary or fanci-
ful sense.52  Thus a designation cannot constitute a trade-mark
if it is a generic term which the prospective purchasers are likely
to regard as a common name for the goods; 53 a descriptive term
which they are likely to regard as descriptive of the goods;5 4 a
geographical term which prospective buyers are likely to think
indicates an actual geographical relation; 55 or if it is a personal
name" which prospective purchasers are likely to regard. as re-
ferring to a person who has an actual commercial association
with the goods.
50 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1952). This act is a relatively comprehensive statement of the fed-
eral law on the subfect. Despite radical changes in definition and
use of terms, the act appears to have effected very few, if any,
important changes in the substance of the common law of trade-
marks and trade names. See Johnson v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 860 (1949). See also Report of At-
torney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 259 (March
31, 1955).
51 Restatement, Torts § 715 (1938).
52 See, e.g., Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills,
Inc., 297 F. 247 (S.D. N.Y. 1923), Drake Medicine Co. v. Glessner,
68 Ohio St. 337, 67 N.E. 722 (1903).
53 See, e.g., Wilhartz v. Turco Products, Inc., 164 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.
1947).
5 4 See, e.g., Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills,
Inc., 297 F. 247 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
55 See, e.g., Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179
U.S. 665 (1901) and California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, 162 F.2d
893 (2d Cir. 1947).
G0 See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S.
118 (1905).
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A. TERMINOLOGY USED
There are some trade-marks such a "dacron" (fiber) which
are considered "strong" because they have no meaning other
than as a designation of a product which comes from a particular
source. Others, not so strong, such as "Postum" (a drink made
by Post), "Tums" (for acid indigestion, hence, "for the tummy"),
"Sanka" (a coffee product from which caffeine has been ex-
tracted), and "V-8" (vegetable drink containing the juices of eight
vegetables), subtly suggest other ideas. However, the vast ma-
jority of trade-marks are clearly generic, descriptive, or geograph-
ical terms or are surnames which qualify as trade-marks only
because they are used in an arbitrary or fanciful way so that the
public is not likely to regard them as having any significance other
than as trade-marks. Familiar examples are "Aunt Jemima" (pan-
cake flour), "Log Cabin" (syrup), "Arrow" (shirts), "Green Giant"
(canned peas), "Camel" (cigarettes), "Prince Albert" (pipe to-
bacco), "LaTouraine" (coffee), "Birds Eye" (frozen foods), "Kiwi"
(shoe polish), "Paris" (garters), and "Four Roses" (whisky).
A trade 'name may be any designation which is adopted by
a person and used to denominate goods he markets or services
he renders or a business he conducts, provided such use is not
against public policy.5 It makes no difference that the designa-
tion is a generic, descriptive, or geographical term or is a sur-
name which has an actual relation to the goods, services or busi-
ness with which it is used. However, the owner of the designa-
tion is not entitled to relief against the use of the designation
by others unless the designation has acquired a secondary mean-
ing;58 i.e., unless through its association with such goods, services
or business, the designation has come to be understood by a sub-
stantial number of present or prospective purchasers as indicating
some particular source of the goods or services, or some partic-
ular business."9 Examples of trade names are "Schlitz" (beer),
"Maidenform" (bras), "Suds-Miser" (washing machine), "Grey-
57 Restatement, Torts § 716.
58 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Wm. Merrill Chemical Co., 269 F. 209 (6th
Cir. 1920), Restatement, Torts § 716(b).
59 Restatement, Torts § 716 (1938). "Any name, geographical or other-
wise, applied to a product, becomes an asset to the person who ad-
vertises and markets that product as soon as the public begins to
associate that name with that product." Hartman v. Cohn, 350 Pa.
41, 43, 38 A.2d 22, 24 (1944).
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hound" (bus service), and "Canadian Club" (whisky made in
Canada).
In brief, a trade-mark may be used only in marketing goods
whereas a trade name may be used in connection with goods,
services or a business; a trade-mark must be attached to the goods
whereas a trade name need not be attached to anything; a trade-
mark may not be merely a generic, descriptive, or geographical
term or merely a surname whereas a trade name may be; and
finally, a trade-mark is entitled to protection as soon as it is used
in marketing goods whereas a trade name is not entitled to pro-
tection until it has acquired a secondary meaning. These are the
principal differences.
Obviously the lines are not clearly defined. There are many
times when it is not at all clear whether the court is thinking
in terms of trade-marks or trade names because the distinction
would have no effect on the outcome of the case. 0 However,
differences in terminology often suggest the presence or absence
of particular interests which may have a bearing on the outcome.
For this reason attention to the distinctions may be helpful in
analyzing individual cases. Let us turn now to a more specific
consideration of the interests which may be involved in a case
involving alleged infringement of a trade-mark or of a trade
name.
B. PRINCIPAL INTERESTS N TRADE-MARK AND TRADE NAME CASES
One of the major interests in the law of trade-marks and
trade names is society's interest in competition, which requires
that buyers be informed with respect to the various sellers and
their offerings. This interest adds weight to the plaintiff's side
of the scales because principles which give recognition to trade-
marks and trade names support a system of trade in which mem-
bers of the public can distinguish the sources of the available
goods and services. 61
60 See, e.g., Newbro v. Undeland, 69 Neb. 821, 96 N.W. 635 (1903).
"The evidence in this case fails to establish any reasonable likeli-
hood that deception did or would result by reason of the use of
the name 'Big Chief' by the defendant." Peterson & Co. v. Jay,
158 Neb. 305, 309, 63 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1954).
61 "The purchaser may say to himself, so long as I deal at the basket
store, I will get the goods for a less price. . . ." Basket Stores v.
Allen, 99 Neb. 217, 219, 155 N.W. 893, 894 (1915).
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The principles of law relating to infringement of trade-marks
and trade names - unfair competition in the narrow sense -
have evolved from the action of deceit, 2 which required an in-
tent to deceive. This indicates that one of the weightier factors
on plaintiff's side of the scales has been society's interest in mor-
ality, which is offended whenever one merchant palms off his
goods as the goods of another. At one time this probably was
the primary interest, because the success or failure of plaintiff's
case depended upon his being able to show that the defendant
acted with intent to deceive.63  That this interest has lost some
of its weight is shown by the readiness with which courts now
grant relief without reference to whether or not any fraudulent
intent has been shown.64 That society's interest in honesty has
not lost all of its weight is shown by the frequency with which
the granting of relief beyond an injunction is conditioned upon
the showing of fraudulent intent. 5 It also is shown by the fact
that the presence or absence of fraudulent intent usually will
tilt the scales in close cases in which the plaintiff's mark is weak,"
62 Restatement, Torts Introductory Note to Chapter 35, (Confusion of
Source) at 539 (1938).
63 Ibid.
64 "(W)hen similarity is established, good faith-even if proven-is no
defense." LaTouraine v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 118
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 771 (1946). "The undisputed evi-
dence shows that the name adopted by defendants and their man-
ner of displaying it on their truck will quite likely mislead the
public .... Without questioning the motives or honesty of de-
fendants ... a court of equity should hold that they have made
no defense to this suit." Carter Transfer & Storage Co. v. Carter,
106 Neb. 531, 535, 184 N.W. 113, 114 (1921).
65 "But there was here no showing of fraud or palming off. Their
absence, of course, does not undermine the finding of unfair compe-
tition. (citations omitted) But the character of the conduct giving
rise to the unfair competition is relevant to the remedy which should
be afforded." Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125,
130. See also Note, "Measure of Recovery in the Law of Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition," 30 Col. L. Rev. 242 (1930) and Re-
statement, Torts § 745 (1938).
66 See, e.g., Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Brooks, 91 Neb. 421, 136 N.W.
60 (1912). Plaintiff corporation qbtained an injunction against the
use by defendant, a former employee, of "Canon Cristo" in the sale
of coal even though the Court conceded that the name was both
descriptive and geographical and that the coal sold by both parties
originated at the same mine.
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as well as in cases where there is uncertainty as to whether or
not plaintiff's trade name has acquired a secondary meaning.6 7
Weighing in favor of plaintiff in trade-mark and trade name
cases is society's interest in encouraging industry and integrity,
which is advanced whenever plaintiff is permitted to reap the
benefits of furnishing goods or services of high quality.68 On
the same side of the scales is the plaintiff's interest in freedom
to pursue economic opportunities without unreasonable interfer-
ence. Also favoring plaintiff is society's, as well as the individual's,
interest in the security of economic advantage which is given
weight whenever a court refers to the plaintiff's "good will" and
treats the plaintiff's interest in his mark or name as property.69
Carrying substantial weight on defendant's side of the scales
in trade-mark and trade name infringement cases, as in most
other business tort cases, is the individual's interest in freedom
to pursue economic advantage. Also weighing on defendant's
side is the social interest as well as the individual interest in
freedom to draw upon the existing store of words and symbols,
since these interests are sacrificed to some degree every time a
trade-mark or trade name is given legal protection. This interest
is usually the determining factor in cases where relief is said
to be denied on the ground that a designation is merely generic,70
G7 See, e.g., Chadron Opera House v. Loomer, 71 Neb. 785, 99 N.W. 649
(1904).
G s See, e.g., Basket Stores v. Allen, 99 Neb. 217, 155 N.W. 893 (1915).
,39 This appears to be a vital interest in cases wherein the courts grant
relief even though the parties are not in competition. See Aunt
Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied
245 U.S. 672 (1918) wherein the court granted the maker of pan-
cake flour an injunction against the defendant's use of plaintiff's
mark in marketing syrup. See also Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Pro-
ductions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup.Ct. 1932), aff'd 262
N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933) in which the court enjoined the use of
the name "Tiffany" by a distributor of motion pictures although
there was no likelihood that anyone would think that motion pic-
tures had any relationship to plaintiff's jewelry business.
70 See, e.g., Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Nine, 27 Neb. 507, 43 N.W.
348 (1889). The court affirmed a lower court denial of an injunction
to restrain the defendant from using the name, "The Nebraska Loan
and Trust Company". The plaintiff had started using the name four
years before defendant. The court said: "The words 'loan and trust'
are simply indicative of the character of the business which they
propose to carry on . . . there can be no special property or right
in them. As a general rule geographical names are not the sub-
ject of property as a trade name."
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descriptive,7 ' or geographical, 72 or is merely a surname.73 The
importance of this interest is greatly diminished when a desig-
nation is used in an arbitrary or fanciful sense because, in this
case, there is very little likelihood that anyone other than the
plaintiff will wish to use it in the same arbitrary or fanciful sense
except for the purpose of riding the plaintiff's coattails. Conse-
quently, where a mark or name is used in an arbitrary or fanci-
ful sense, the interest in freedom to draw on the existing store
of words and symbols rarely tilts the scales in defendant's favor.1 4
The interest in freedom to draw on the available store of
words and symbols is sometimes overbalanced by society's interest
in avoiding injustice by preventing a defendant from reaping
where he has not sown, at the expense of the plaintiff.'5 Where
a trade-mark is involved, the fact that plaintiff is required to
show some ingenuity either by creating a new symbol or by us-
ing an old one in a fanciful or arbitrary sense, means that the
point of injustice may be reached even before the public'has come
to recognize the mark as designating the goods of the plaintiff.76
71 "A descriptive mark is bad for two reasons: First, because it does
not advise the public that the goods come from a single source;
and second that, if so, since the word is descriptive of the goods, the
protection of the word as a trademark would be an infringement
upon common speech. . . ." NuGrape v. Guest, 164 F.2d 874, 876(10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 874 (1947). See e.g., Franklin
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247
(S.D. N.Y. 1923).
72 See, e.g., Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Nine, 27 Neb. 507, 43 N.W.
348 (1889).
73 See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S.
118 (1905).
74 See, e.g., Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S.
251 (1916). In Johnson v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied 338 U.S. 860 (1949), the court refused to enjoin de-
fendant's use of "Johnson" in marketing a cleaner even though such
use caused confusion among purchasers of plaintiff's wax products.
The court stated, "In the case of fabricated marks which have no
significance save as they denote a single source or origin of the
goods to which they are attached, the first user's right may go so
far. The second user can then show no interest of his own; and if
... his only purpose is to trade on the first user's good will, it is
indeed time to intervene."
75 "If defendants seek to take advantage of the name under which the
plaintiff has been doing business, it is, to say the least, unfair. If
theirs is a good store, they can build up a reputation of their own."
Basket Stores v. Allen, 99 Neb. 217, 220, 155 N.W. 893, 894-95 (1915).
76 See, e.g., Morgans Sons Co. v. Ward, 152 Fed. 690 (7th Cir. 1907).
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In the case of a trade name (which does not call for the exercise
of ingenuity), the courts do not recognize any serious offense
to the interest in justice until the plaintiff's mark has acquired
a secondary meaning; that is, until an appreciable portion of the
public has come to recognize the name as designating goods or
services of which plaintiff is the source.77
Carrying great weight in trade-mark and trade name cases
is the social interest in avoiding confusion and mistake among
members of the public.7 8 Indeed, the cases are few79 wherein
the courts will grant relief against trade-marks or trade name
infringement unless it is shown that this interest has been of-
fended. That this interest is not sufficient of itself to override
all possible interests which may appear on the defendant's side
of the scales is shown by the fact that the courts will sometimes
refuse injunctive relief even though it is quite likely that de-
fendant's continued use of a designation will lead to confusion
among members of the public.80
VII. THE TRADE SECRET CASES
Turning from trade-marks and trade names to trade secrets,
one finds some familiar as well as some new interests. On the
77 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Win. S. Merril Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209
(6th Cir. 1920).
78 "(T)he paramount interest to be protected in these . . . cases is the
consumers'." Judge Frank, dissenting in LaTouraine v. Lorraine,
157 F.2d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 771 (1946). See
California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.
2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1948) wherein the court denied relief to
the owner of the mark "Sunkist" used in marketing fruits and
vegetables against the use of "Sunkist" in marketing bread. The
court remarked, "Unless 'Sunkist' covers everything edible under
the sun, we cannot believe that anyone whose I.Q. is high enough
to be regarded by the law would be likely to be confused in the
purchase of a loaf of bread branded as 'Sunkist' because someone
else sold fruits and vegetables under that name." See also NuGrape
v. Guest, 164 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 874
(1947), wherein, although plaintiff had spent $800,000 in advertising
its soft drink as "NuGrape" and it was assumed for the sake of
argument that the name had acquired a secondary meaning, relief
was denied against defendant's using "TrueGrape" in selling a sim-
ilar drink because plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of confusion.
79 See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679,
264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1932).
SO Johnson v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338
U.S. 860 (1949).
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side of the claimant in almost all trade secret cases will be found
the interest in rewarding and encouraging initiative as well as
the interest in justice which is promoted when one person is
prevented from reaping where another has sown. As important
as these interests are, however, standing alone they are usually
outweighed by the interest in the free promulgation and use of
ideas and other interests which usually follow in its wake. If
one asserting rights in a trade secret is to succeed, some addi-
tional interest must appear on his side of the scales.8'
If the action is one in which the claimant is seeking to bar
or recover for the revelation or use of the idea, this additional
interest may appear in the interest in the security of contracts.
This interest tilts the scales in favor of the claimant in cases
in which the person about to use or reveal the information is
under an obligation, by virtue of an express or an implied con-
tract, not to do so.8 2 If it does not appear that there is any con-
tractual duty to refrain from using or communicating the idea,
the extra weight necessary to tilt the scales in favor of the plain-
tiff may be the interest in morality which is offended when-
ever a confidence is violated.8 3  Where there is no contract or
confidence on which to base an obligation not to use or reveal
an idea, the scales may be tilted in favor of the claimant of the
trade secret by the interest in morality which is offended by
the fact that the defendant has been chargeable with some im-
propriety in obtaining the trade secret.8 4
Even though it appears that the scales have been tilted in
favor of a claimant of a trade secret by the fact that the dis-
closure of an idea would violate an obligation based on a contract
or a confidence, the interest in justice may cause them to re-tilt
in favor of a defendant if it appears that, at the time the defendant
induced the disclosure of the idea, he was unaware that there
was any obligation not to divulge it and, before learning of the
obligation, substantially changed his position.sr
81 Restatement, Torts § 757.
82 See, e.g., Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S. 2d
138 (1946).
83 "It is the usual incident of confidential relations. If there is any
disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiffs' secrets he must
take the burden with the good." E. I. DuPont DeNemours Powder
Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
84 See, e.g., Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J.Eq. 756, 55 Atl. 736 (1903).
85 See, e.g., Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.,
172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949). Restatement, Torts § 758(b).
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VIII. BUSINESS TORTS BASED ON STATUTE
It has been said that trade-marks, trade names and trade
secrets are creatures of the courts rather than of the legislatures.
In contrast, the principles which govern patents and copyrights
are based almost entirely on statute, the Constitution,"0 and other
acts of Congress.87 Nonetheless, much the same type of analysis
can be made in considering these latter types of intangible bus-
iness property.
A. INFINGE ENT OF PATENTS
A patent gives the patent holder the right to exclude others
from making, using or vending anything within the scope of that
patent for a period of seventeen years.8 8
At the heart of the patent laws is society's interest in ec-
onomic development which is promoted by encouraging the con-
ception, revelation and exploitation of useful ideas of a limited type.
It is important to realize that the courts do not view the
patent laws as evidencing any policy to promote the social in-
terest in ordinary productive effort. The maintenance of the sys-
tem of competition, and the principles governing trade secrets 9
apart from the patent laws, are deemed to be sufficient for this
purpose. That is why the Supreme Court has refused to recog-
nize the validity of a patent which is based upon an advance
which demonstrates nothing more than the work of one "skilled
in the art," and has insisted that a patent must be based upon
an advance which displays a "flash of creative genius."90
However, even the display of genius is not, standing alone, a
sufficient interest to justify the granting of a patent. It rqust
be accompanied by the interest which society has in the revelation
of the invention so that it may some day be used by persons other
86 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 'of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U. S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
87 Patents: 35 U.S.C., §§ 1-293 (1952); Copyrights: 17 U.S.C., §§ 1-215
(1952).
83 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
89 See, e.g., A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d
531 (6th Cir. 1934).
90 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84
(1941). See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
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than the inventor and his successorsY1 The public interest in
revelation lies behind the principle which denies the right to a
patent where it appears that the invention has been exploited
secretly prior to the application for the patent.92 It also lies be-
hind the limitation on the time within which a patent applica-
tion must be filed,93 as well as the rule which requires that the
application describe the invention with sufficient clarity and com-
pleteness to enable one skilled in the art to understand and use
it.94
Regardless of the quality of the mental effort which gives
rise to an advance, and regardless of the thoroughness with which
it is revealed, the social interests involved are not deemed to
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156 (1950), in which the Supreme
Court declared invalid a patent on a counter with an extension to
receive a bottomless self-loading tray with which to push the con-
tents of the tray in front of a cashier. It was stated that the Patent
Office "has placed a host of gadgets under the armor of patents--
gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme
of advancing scientific knowledge." (concurring opinion). The courts
have expressed the requirements of invention in various terms. Some
lower courts have followed the Supreme Court and have required
that the work be "the result of inventive genius." See, e.g., Love
Tractor Inc. v. Continental Farm Equipment Co., 91 F.Supp. 193,
198 (Omaha D. Neb. 1950). Many lower courts have accepted some-
thing less. "(W)e are rejecting the flash of genius test." Chicago
Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812 (7th
Cir. 1943). In the hope of achieving a higher degree of uniformity
and to establish a less severe standard than "display of creative
genius" the 1952 Patent Laws provided: "A patent may not be ob-
tained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). How-
ever, this may not be the final word. "The standard of invention
is written into the Constitution." Original Foods, Inc. v. Chun King
Sales, Inc., 244 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1957). For the historical back-
ground of the problem, see Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
91 See, e.g., Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 159
F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1947).
92 See, e.g., Huszar v. Cincinnati Chemical Works, 172 F.2d (6th Cir.
1949); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., 246 Fed.
695 (6th Cir. 1917).
93 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952).
94 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952).
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be sufficient to justify the granting of a patent if it appears that
the invention is already within the field of readily available public
knowledge (e.g., where it already is known or used by others
in this country or where it already has been patented or described
in a printed publication anywhere in the world), 9 r even though
it is conceded that the applicant inventor had no knowledge of
any prior work.98
Behind the highly complicated rules which are applied in
determining who among several rival inventors has satisfied the
requirement of priority of invention9" is the interest in justice
which is promoted by holding that first in time is first in right
and which also is promoted by an orderly procedure for determin-
ing rights on the basis of criteria which may be tested objectively.
The basic right which arises when a patent is granted is
the right to exclude9" others from making, using, or vending, the
subject matter of the patent. The fact that this creates a limited
monopoly which is offensive to the system of competition, weighs
heavily in favor of the defendant in every infringement action.
The interest in competition also lies behind the action of the
courts in declaring .a patent invalid after it has been granted by
the Patent Office; 99 it lies behind the rule which permits any
interested party to bring an action to have a patent declared in-
valid; 00 it lies behind the rule that a patent should be declared
invalid when it claims too much and there is an unreasonable
95 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952).
96 See, e.g., Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949) where-
in the Supreme Court declared invalid a patent on a complicated
process which had revolutionized the cheap jewelry industry, largely
on the ground that the process was nothing more than a refinement
of a method described in the Treatises on Goldsmithing and Sculp-
ture written by Benvenuto Cellini in the 16th century.
97 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1952).
98 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952). "(I)t does not give him the right to make,
use, or sell his own invention if it happens to infringe the claims
of some prior patent even though his invention may be a decided
improvement on the device illustrated in the prior patent." Hoar,
Patent Tactics and Law 7 (3d Ed. 1950). Until a patent is granted,
all persons who lawfully learn of the invention are free to exploit
it if doing so does not infringe a patent already issued. Gayler v.
Wilder, 10 How. 477, 493 (1850).
99 See, e.g., U. S. Chemical Corp. v. Plastic Glass Corp., 243 F. 892
(3rd Cir. 1957).
100 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1952).
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delay in making a disclaimer; 1 1 it lies behind the rule that a
patent must be narrowly construed in determining whether or
not infringement has occurred' 0 2 and it lies behind the time
limitation of seventeen years provided in the patent laws as
well as in the provision for a time limitation in the constitutional
provision on which these laws are based. In fact, the bulk of
the rules relating to patents can be appreciated only by taking
into consideration society's interest in maintaining competition.
B. INFRINGEIENT OF COPYRIGHTS
In general, a copyright entitles a copyright holder to bar
others from exploiting the copyrighted work without his per-
mission. This right is initially granted for twenty-eight years
but it may be extended a like period at the option of the copyright
holder.103
Many of the interests given weight in patent cases are also
given weight in copyright cases. For example, the social interest
in promoting constructive effort and the social interest in per-
mitting a person to reap where he has sown are likely to be
found on the plaintiff's side of the scales whereas the social in-
terest in competition and the individual interest in being free
to do as one pleases are likely to be found on the defendant's
side. Of course, where the same interest is given weight in both
types of cases, the relative weight assigned to the interest is
likely to be different in a copyright case from what it is in a
patent case. Furthermore, some of the interests which carry weight
in patent cases carry no weight in copyright cases and vice versa.
Thus, the social interest in the introduction of new ideas which
is paramount in the patent laws carries no weight in the copy-
right laws which are concerned only with the social interest in
the expression 0 4 of the ideas. Thus, if a writer independently
prepares a description of a well known system, he is entitled to
protection against the copying of his manner of expression even
though he, himself, has contributed no new ideas.'05
101 See, e.g., Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States,
320 U.S. 1, 58 (1943).
102 See, e.g., Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., 194 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1952).
103 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952).
104 See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899), and Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
1o5 See, e.g., Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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To give rise to a statutory copyright, it is necessary that the
work when published contain a proper notice of copyrightu 6 so
that all the world may know that copyright is claimed.10 7 Since
most of the works which come to the attention of members of
the public either are not copyrighted at all or are no longer pro-
tected by copyright, because the period of time provided by the
copyright statutes has expired, the interest in justice is served
by this principle which requires that reasonable notice be given
before charging a person with infringement.
Even assuming that there has been complete compliance with
the copyright statute requirements with respect to notice, the
right to sue for infringement is contingent upon depositing copies
of the work in the copyright office.' 08 This provision protects
the public interest in preserving worthy works for the diffusion
of knowledge as well as the public interest in being informed
with respect to the existence and extent of alleged copyright
monopolies.' 0 9
Under the copyright laws, any original work, reduced to
recognizable form and duly registered, is entitled to protection in
the courts. There is no need to display invention or a special
quality of .effort as in the case of a patent." 0 This apparent
laxity in granting legal protection does not reflect a lack of con-
cern for work of high quality. Rather it is felt that the interest
in such work can be best promoted by a liberal policy which
avoids the risk of discouraging further effort by those who al-
ready possess real ability and at the same time encourages the
development of new talent. A liberal policy in this regard also
reflects an interest in maintaining the dignity of the courts which
would be jeopardized if judges were called upon to determine the
merits of alleged works of art."' Finally, it reflects the fact that
106 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952). See, e.g., State v. State Journal Co., 75 Neb.
275, 106 N.W. 434 (1905).
107 See, e.g., Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40
(1939).
os 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
109 Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47-50 (dissent-
ing).
110 See, e.g., National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications,
191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951).
111 "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pic-
torial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most -obvious limits.
At the one extreme some works of ge ius would be sure to miss
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the social interest in competition is not as great in copyright as
in patent cases because of the far greater economic consequences
of patent monopolies.
C. BusnEss TORTS BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF THE -A.NTITRUST LAws
There are a number of statutes relating to business conduct
which provide a civil remedy to anyone injured by a violation.
Where this is so, the violation is a business tort.
Some of these statutes are state and some are federal. By
far the most important of these statutes are two of the federal
anitrust laws" 2 - the Sherman Act, which declares it to be illegal
to restrain trade or to monopolize, or to attempt to monopolize,
and the amendment to the Clayton Act known as the Robinson-
Patman Act, the principal purpose of which is to induce sellers
to refrain from discriminating among buyers. Although the state
statutes are far from uniform, in general they embody the same
broad principles which are found in the federal statutes.113
Among the different types of conduct which may constitute
violations of the Sherman Act as well as many of the state acts
dealing with restraints of trade and monopolies are: agreements
to fix prices,114 agreements to divide markets,", agreements to
limit output," 6 individual refusals to deal," 7 group boycotts," 8
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251(1903).
112 Sherman Anti-Trust Act: 26 Stat. 209. (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
Robinson-Patman Act: 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
Although the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914),
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1952) is usually considered to be one of the
major antitrust statutes, it is not considered here because "unfair
methods of competition" proscribed by section 5 of the act do not
afford a basis for a private action except where the right of action
would have existed even without the Act.
113 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Ch. 59 (Reissue 1952) Monopolies and Un-
lawful Combinations.
114 See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271
(6th Cir. 1898).
116 See, e.g., Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
117 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359 (1927).
118 See, e.g., Marsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 98 Neb. 523, 153 N.W. 573 (1915).
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agreements not to compete, 19 misuse of patents,120 misuse of
copyrights,12' predatory trade practices, 1 2 2 intimidation,1 23 under-
selling,124 and many other types of misconduct.
Some of these practices give rise to a private right of action
for damages even in the absence of any statute. However, some
of the statutes go further. Thus, the Sherman Act provides that
anyone who has been injured as the result of conduct which
violates the Act has the right to recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee. 125 Similar relief is available to those who acquire
a private right of action by virtue of violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act.126  Some of the state statutes also* grant similar
relief.127  These provisions for civil action are based in part upon
the social and individual interest in justice which is promoted
by permitting an injured party to recover from one who has
caused him foreseeable harm and in part upon the social interest
in discouraging violations of the antitrust laws.12 8
119 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271
(6th Cir. 1898).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
121 See, e.g., Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n., 231 U.S. 222, 236
(1913).
122 See, e.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923).
123 See, e.g., Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902).
124 See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931).
125 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1952).
126 Clayton Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
127 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-821 (Reissue 1952) which provides
that: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by any other person or persons, by reason of anything forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by sections 59-801 to 59-828 (these sections
deal with unlawful restraints of trade) may sue therefor in any
court of record in this state, in the county in which the defendant
or defendants reside or are found, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
128 The 1955 amendment to the federal antitrust laws raising the max-
imum fine for antitrust law violations of $5,000 to $50,000 also pro-
motes the latter interest. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp.
111, 1955).
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Of course, the fundamental interest intended to be promoted
by the antitrust laws is society's interest in competition.' 2 9 This
interest lies behind the rules which govern the many diverse
types of conduct which have been held to violate these laws.
'This is true even though the wrongs may appear to have little
in common and the principles occasionally appear to be working
at cross-purposes. Thus, while the Robinson-Patman Act restrains
the freedom of sellers to charge what they please, its basic pur-
pose is to increase competition at various levels and to block one
of the most effective paths to monopoly - discrimination. 3
Society's interest in competition is not the only interest sought
to be promoted by the antitrust laws. Various degrees of im-
portance are assigned also to the interest in economic freedom
which is promoted by preventing monopoly; the interest in justice
which is promoted when opportunity in the economic arena is
not limited to the few; the interest in sound government which
is promoted by a system which shields against government by
129 "The Sherman Act seeks to protect men in the right freely to com-
pete and to prevent practices which must result in oppressing compe-
tition." Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness 127 (1934). "The public
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price con-
trol by the maintenance of competition." United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
130 Discrimination which has nothing to do with efficiency creates a
path to monopoly for the beneficiary of the discrimination. Brandeis,
The Curse of Bigness 140 (1934). "If this method of competition
were approved, the pattern for the growth of monopoly would be
simple." Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread, 348 U.S. 115, 119 (1954).
"It is within the knowledge of all that ... people have de-
pressed prices in one locality where there was competition, and in-
creased them in others, where there was none, thus avoiding a loss,
until the competitor was driven out of business, when prices would
be raised to an unreasonable and oppressive extent. . . ." State v.
Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 260, 117 N.W. 768, 770 (1908). See Learned
and Isaacs, "The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and
Expectations," 15 Harv. Bus. Rev., Winter 1937, p. 137. For a detailed
analysis of the Robinson-Patman Act as well as other antitrust laws
see Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practices (1950), and Federal Anti-
trust Laws (1948).
Fair trade legislation also has been criticized on the ground that
it restrains sellers in setting their prices. However, such legisla-
tion has been described as "an aid to competition, preventing as it
does, the extension of the trust and chain stores." Brandeis, The
Curse of Bigness 128 (1934). Compare McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis
& Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955) holding un-
constitutional the Nebraska Fair Trade Act, Neb. Rev. Stat., ch. 59,
art. 11.
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business; the interest in national defense which is promoted by
a system which protects the government against the hazards of
being dependent upon a single business for the implements of
defense, and various other interests. Nevertheless, the interest
in competition remains the dominant interest in cases under the'
antitrust laws, just as it is dominant in most other cases in the
field of business torts.
IX. CONCLUSION
Business torts arising from violations of the antitrust law
appears to be a suitable subject with which to close. It has not
been the purpose of the foregoing discussion to consider all of
the reasons behind all of the rules in the law of business torts
and at times the picture has been painted with a rather broad
brush. However, it is hoped that the discussion has been suf-
ficiently detailed to demonstrate an approach to business tort
problenis which should facilitate the work of finding and under-
standing the reason behind the rules in this area of the law.
One who has acquired the habit of proceeding by first familiar-
izing himself with the facts and then seeking to identify and
evaluate the various interests involved in a given situation is
well along the road to obtaining a sound grasp of legal principles
in whatever area of the law he happens to be studying. More
important, he has developed an attitude and facility which, prop-
erly used in the law-making process, whether by judge, legislator,
administrator, attorney, teacher, sociologist, political scientist, or
anyone else engaged in the law-making process, should strengthen
the hope that the law will serve the purpose of social ,control
aimed at goals worthy of man.
